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Evidence Law in the Next Millennium
by
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK*
Evidence is a unique area of law because over the last two centu-
ries so many of its greatest scholars have taken what has been de-
scribed as an abolitionist view toward the subject.' Jeremy Bentham
started the tradition by attacking virtually the entire body of evidence
law as it existed in nineteenth century England.2 But other leading
scholars have also favored abolition or abandonment of major por-
tions of the law of evidence. Dean Wigmore called for rejection of
many rules of exclusion3 and Professor Morgan advocated such radi-
cal reform that the Model Code of Evidence, of which he was princi-
pal draftsman, failed to be adopted by any jurisdiction. Sir Rupert
Cross, one of the leading evidence scholars of this century, reportedly
stated that "I am working for the day when my subject is abolished.' 4
Even Dean McCormick favored eviscerating two of evidence law's
broadest doctrines of exclusion-the hearsay rule and the law of
privileges-by supporting a simple reliability test as a sufficient basis
for admitting hearsay' and a balancing test that would allow most
privileges to be overridden in cases where there was a strong need for
the privileged evidence.6 He went so far as to predict the ultimate
demise of all rules of exclusion.'
* Hershner Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Oregon School of Law.
1. Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 11 CANADIAN J. OF L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 279 (1996).
2. See JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (J.S. Mill ed.,
London 1827) (five volumes); see also Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Scholarly and Institutional
Challenges to the Law of Evidence: From Bentham to the ADR Movement, 25 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 837, 837 (1992).
3. 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 8c, at 630 (Tillers rev. 1983) ("A complete
abolition of the rules in the future is at least arguable, not merely in theory but in realiz-
able fact.... [It has been shown] that in the United States and today justice can be done
without the orthodox rules of evidence.").
4. See WILLIAM L. TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 1
(1990).
5. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 305, at 634
(1954) ("I suggest this: a hearsay statement will be received if the judge finds that the
need for and the probative value of the statement render it a fair means of proof under
the circumstances.").
6. Id. § 81, at 166-67.
7. Charles T. McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A. J. 507, 580-81
(1938) ("So we have said that the hard rules of exclusion will soften into standards of dis-
cretion to exclude. But evolution will not halt there. Manifestly, the next stage is to
abandon the system of exclusion."); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to the
Rules of Evidence for Nonjury Cases, 50 A.B.A. J. 723, 726 (1964) ("Anglo-American ex-
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There is probably no other area of law where the scholarly chal-
lenges to fundamental doctrines have been so extreme and where the
leading writers take such a dim view of its future. Grant Gilmore
wrote of the Death of Contract,8 but he was talking about something
very different and never appeared to contemplate the demise of con-
tracts as a viable and vital subspecialty of law. Evidence Law Adrift
is a superb book, but it very much falls within the abolitionist tradi-
tion in evidence law scholarship. Professor Damagka is gentle in his
title in describing evidence law as being only "adrift." After reading
the book, one comes away with a clear impression that the great ship
of evidence law is not merely adrift; instead, it is on the rocks and
taking on water fast.
The central argument of Evidence Law Adrift is set forth as a
relatively straightforward syllogism. The major premise is that evi-
dence law is inextricably intertwined with the jury trial so that if the
role of the jury declines, so will the importance of evidence law.9 The
minor premise is that the jury trial is now in a period of decline. This
leads to the inexorable conclusion that evidence law is also now in a
downward spiral. To use Professor Damagka's more vivid and pro-
vocative imagery, the current rules of evidence are in danger of be-
coming "antiquated period pieces, intellectual curiosa confined in an
oubliette in the castle of justice."l"
The major premise seems generally sound and has strong histori-
cal support. The common law of evidence developed as a means to
control juries, and countries without jury trials never developed rules
of evidence even remotely resembling our own." It is highly doubtful
clusionary rules of evidence are unique in the world. Lawyers of other lands are unable to
understand why relevant evidence that has probative force should be barred from consid-
eration.... Our sick body of evidence law will get well sooner if our American evidence
doctors will consult with some European evidence doctors.").
8. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACr (1974).
9. Professor Dama~ka posits "three pillars" supporting existing evidence doctrine:
(1) jury trials, (2) temporal compression of adjudication, and (3) the adversary system.
See MIRJAN DAMA KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 4 (1997). But the second two "pillars-
are interconnected with the first. It is the existence of the jury that causes temporal com-
pression, because juries are expected to try the case at one sitting and seriatim proceed-
ings are generally possible only in nonjury trials. Also, the adversary system and the jury
trial are closely connected, and, as Dama~ka observes later in the book, any weakening of
the adversary system is taking place primarily in nonjury trials. See id. at 126-29.
10. Id. at 142.
11. See WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 8a, at 621 ("The rules of evidence are mainly
aimed at guarding the jury from the overweening effect of certain kinds of evidence. The
whole fabric is kept together by that purpose, and the rules are supposed to enshrine that
purpose."). For a history of the development of evidence law, see JAMES THAYER.
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW (1898). For a contrasting
view of the origin of evidence law, see John H. Langbein. Historical Foundations of the
Law of Evidence: A View From the Ryder Sources, 96 COLIJM. L. REV. 1168 (1996) (at-
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that the current law of evidence could survive the abandonment of
jury trials. The linkage between jury trials and evidence law also has
empirical support. Those countries which have cut back on jury trials
have subsequently liberalized their rules of admissibility. For exam-
ple, after England abolished the right to a jury trial in most civil
cases, it then significantly expanded the admissibility of hearsay."l
Similar developments are taking place elsewhere. 3
But the minor premise-that jury trials are in the process of de-
cline-is subject to challenge, at least if the focus is on the United
States. In the small fraction of cases that actually go to trial, the
dominant form of trial in the United States remains the jury trial, at
least in major cases. Approximately 80% of tort claims that go to
trial are tried to a jury14 and approximately 60% of criminal trials are
jury trials.'5 For major felonies, such as crimes of violence, there are
twice as many jury trials as bench trials.'6 It is estimated that there
are between 150,000 to 300,000 jury trials in the United States each
year, 17 constituting over 90% of all jury trials conducted in the
world. 8 Jury trials continue to have the strong support of the Ameri-
can public and are enshrined as a matter of right in both federal and
state constitutions, and in both criminal and civil cases. Congress re-
cently voted to extend the right to jury trial to an increasingly impor-
tant category of civil cases-Title VII claims for employment dis-
crimination-where previously such claims could only be tried to the
court.' 9
Professor Dama~ka bases his contention that the importance of
tributing rise of evidence law to adversarial criminal trials).
12. Civil Evidence Act, 1968 (Eng.).
13. See Civil Evidence Act, 1988, § 2(I) (Scotland); see also NEW ZEALAND LAW
COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY PAPER No. 15, EVIDENCE LAW: HEARSAY 11 (1991) (pro-
posing significant narrowing of hearsay rule in civil cases).
14. BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS, 1995: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 30
(National Center for State Courts, 1996) (surveying state courts).
15. Id. at 57.
16. According to 1992 state court data of prosecutions for crimes of violence, 10% of
prosecutions resulted in jury trials and 5% in bench trials. However, there were more
bench trials than jury trials for offenses such as larceny and drug possession, making the
overall percentage of jury and bench trials roughly comparable (4% jury trials, 4% bench
trials, 92% guilty pleas). BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PUB. NO. NCJ-
151167, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1992, tbl.10 (1995).
17. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 251 (1994) (obtaining 150,000 estimate
from researchers at National Center for State Courts); JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES AND
POLITICS 36 (1992) (providing 300,000 estimate).
18. Gerhard Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, in
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & DAVID S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN
EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 720,721 (1978).
19. See 42 U.S.C. §1981a(c) (1991).
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the jury is declining-and hence the need for evidence law-partly on
the fact that the overwhelming majority of cases, both civil and
criminal, settle or result in a plea bargain and only a small fraction
actually go to trial. But it does not follow that because most cases
settle, the rules of evidence play no role in the settlement process.
On the contrary, both substantive law and evidence law play a vital
role in shaping settlements. The settlement value of a case may go up
or down dramatically depending on whether a contributory negli-
gence defense will be allowed if the case proceeds to trial. Similarly,
the settlement value of a case may rise or fall depending on whether
certain evidence will be allowed, such as evidence of other accidents
involving the same product or the implementation of remedial meas-
ures by the defendant after the accident. In criminal cases, nothing
influences the plea bargaining process more than pretrial rulings by
the trial judge on evidentiary matters, such as whether a defendant's
confession or his criminal history will be admitted at trial.
Evidence law does appear to be in retreat in at least three areas.
The first is character evidence. Federal Rules of Evidence 413
through 415 represent a significant breach in the dike. It seems likely
that character evidence will be allowed to an increasing extent in
criminal cases and that the character evidence rules may be liberal-
ized in civil cases as well.2°
The second is hearsay. The clear trend of the law is in favor of
expanding the admissibility of hearsay. The views of Ronald Allen,21
Roger Park,22 Eleanor Swift,23 and other advocates of liberalization
may ultimately be adopted at least in part.
The third is authentication, which is close to being eliminated as
a discrete evidentiary doctrine, at least in civil cases, by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3)(C). Under this rule, almost all disputes
about the authenticity of exhibits are likely to be resolved prior to
trial.
But the law of evidence is on the advance in other areas. Federal
Rule of Evidence 412, the federal Rape Shield Law, was recently
amended to apply in civil cases as well as criminal cases, and to
crimes other than sexual assault. An amendment to Federal Rule of
Evidence 407 that went into effect on December 1, 1997 expands the
ban against evidence of subsequent remedial measures by expressly
20. See David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and
Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 COLO. L. REV. 1 (1987).
21. Ronald J. Allen, The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission. 76
MINN. L. REV. 797 (1992).
22. Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51
(1987).
23. Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1339
(1987).
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applying it to products liability cases, contrary to the views of two
Circuits and many state courts which have given the rule a narrower
interpretation.
The law of evidentiary privilege is as important as ever.24 In Up-
john Co. v. United States,' the Supreme Court adopted a very broad
attorney-client privilege for corporations that went beyond both the
"control group" test recognized in prior case law and anything that
the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence were willing to codify.
In Jaffee v. Redmond,26 the Supreme Court rejected the views of most
lower federal courts and adopted a new federal psychotherapist-
patient privilege. Moreover, the Supreme Court made the privilege
absolute, rather than qualified, and extended it to social workers as
well as to psychiatrists and psychologists. There are currently pres-
sures to create even more privileges, and some courts and legislatures
have responded favorably to such requests.27
Finally, the rules of evidence most clearly on the advance are
those rules, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 702, that govern the
admissibility of expert and scientific evidence. In Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,28 the Supreme Court made an extraordi-
nary allocation of responsibility to federal trial judges to decide what
scientific evidence is reliable. No longer can federal judges sit back
and rely on the "consensus of the scientific community" as they could
under Frye v. United States.29 Judges have become the gatekeepers
determining when and what types of science will be allowed in the
courtroom, which means that they have enhanced power to decide
what types of claims and defenses will be allowed to go forward."
Any rule of evidence with this much impact upon the course of
litigation would seem to possess a fair amount of vitality. Moreover,
the importance of the judicial gatekeeping function will undoubtedly
grow in the coming years, as litigants attempt to bring more and
24. Arguably, one of the five most significant Supreme Court decisions in the last 25
years was a ruling on privilege law. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S 683, 713 (1974)
(denying a privilege claim for White House tapes, which led to resignation of United
States President).
25. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
26. 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
27. See, e.g., Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 527 (N.D. Fla.
1994) (recognizing privilege for "self-critical analysis"); OR. REv. STAT. § 36.205 (1996)
(establishing privilege for mediators).
28. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
29. 293 F. 1013 (1923).
30. For example, a federal judge applying Federal Rule of Evidence 702 recently
ruled that the plaintiffs' medical evidence in an action for damages resulting from breast
implants was not scientifically valid, thereby preventing the claims of hundreds of plain-
tiffs from going forward to a jury trial. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp.
1387 (D. Or. 1996).
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more new scientific discoveries into the courtroom. Thus, even if
every rule of evidence were repealed other than the rules governing
the admission of scientific evidence, evidence law might still play a
pivotal role in the litigation process both now and in the future.
In conclusion, evidence law does not appear to be adrift, at least
not as yet and at least not in the United States. It seems to be
steaming ahead on course (but I suppose that is what the captain of
the Titanic thought too). The situation is different in England and
Commonwealth countries, such as Australia and New Zealand.
There it may be more accurate to describe evidence law as somewhat
loose from its moorings. With the cutback in the right of jury trial,
there is ongoing examination in those countries of what role evidence
law should play in the future. There we are seeing some of the pre-
dictions of Professor Damagka come true. In these countries, there is
a significant divergence between criminal evidence law and civil evi-
dence law, whereas in the United States we generally have unified
evidence codes. In these countries there is also consideration of
abandoning evidence as a free-standing subject and instead incorpo-
rating it as a component of procedure courses. Is this a harbinger of
what may happen here in coming decades? Perhaps. Do those of us
at this conference represent the last generation of pure evidence
teachers? Possibly. Will most of the rules of evidence we now teach
be repealed in twenty years? I do not believe so. In my view, even
though significant liberalization is probable, rules governing the ad-
missibility of evidence, and perhaps to an increasing extent the
weight it should be given,31 are likely to be an integral part of any
adjudicative system that seeks to foster a rational fact-finding proc-
ess.
31. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 2, at 849 (suggesting that procedures relating to the
evaluation of evidence "will assume increased importance as the rules of exclusion are
relaxed").
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